Legislature(2019 - 2020)BELTZ 105 (TSBldg)
03/01/2019 01:30 PM Senate JUDICIARY
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| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| SB12 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| + | SB 34 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED | ||
| += | SB 12 | TELECONFERENCED | |
SB 12-ASSAULT; SEX OFFENSES; SENTENCING CREDIT
1:32:45 PM
CHAIR HUGHES announced that the first order of business would be
SPONSOR SUBSTITUTE FOR SENATE BILL NO. 12, "An Act relating to
crime and criminal procedure; relating to assault and sexual
assault; relating to harassment; relating to credit toward a
sentence of imprisonment for time spent in a treatment program
or under electronic monitoring; and providing for an effective
date."
1:33:00 PM
CHAIR HUGHES reviewed the action previously taken on the bill.
1:33:43 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE moved to adopt the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for SSSB 12, work order 31-LS0263\O, Radford,
2/27/19, referred to as Version O, as the working document of
the committee.
CHAIR HUGHES objected for discussion purposes.
1:34:25 PM
REGINA LARGENT, Staff, Senator Shelley Hughes, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, on behalf of the sponsor of SSSB 12,
introduced herself.
1:34:48 PM
BUDDY WHITT, Staff, Senator Shelley Hughes, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, on behalf of Chair Hughes, reviewed the
changes in the proposed committee substitute (CS) for SSSB 12,
Version 0. He said that Section 1 is unchanged from the previous
version of the bill and recapped Sections 1-2:
Section 1: Amends AS 11.41.200(a), assault in the
first degree, to add new subsection 5, which adds a
person "knowingly causes another to become unconscious
by means of a dangerous instrument" and defines
"dangerous instrument" in accordance with the
definition in AS 11.81.900. (Page 1, line 6 Page 2,
line 5)
Section 2: Adds "knowingly causing a victim to come
into contact with semen" to the definition of "sexual
contact" in AS 11.[8]1.900(b)(60). (Page 2, lines 6
25)
1:35:52 PM
MR. WHITT explained that the prior version of the bill removed
the word "semen" from the definition of the crime of harassment
in the first degree, so the entire Section 3 was removed from
the bill. He reviewed Section 3, which relates to pretrial.
Section 3: Repeals AS 12.55.027(d) and re-enacts to
specify that a court may not grant credit against a
sentence for time in private residence or on
electronic monitoring. (Page 2, Lines 26 28)
1:36:34 PM
MR. WHITT reviewed Section 4 of the sectional analysis and
stated that this provides a conforming change to AS
12.55.027(e).
Section 4: Amends AS 12.55.027(e) to remove
"electronic monitoring" as an option for claiming
credit toward a sentence of imprisonment. (Page 2,
line 29 Page 3, line 7)
MR. WHITT explained that the next few sections relate to
enhanced sentencing structure and Ms. Largent will answer
questions on those sections.
1:37:15 PM
SENATOR KIEHL directed attention to Section 2 and offered his
belief that this is an excellent approach. He asked for
clarification on the effect of leaving the language "contact
with semen" in the harassment statute as well as in Section 2.
He recalled an attorney had used the phrase, the principle of
leniency or the precept of leniency. He would like to ensure
that the prosecutor would have to charge non-consensual "contact
with semen" as harassment rather than charge the offender with
the appropriate sex crime, such as the offense in the Schneider
case.
MR. WHITT deferred to Mr. Skidmore, Department of Law to address
that specific issue in his testimony.
1:38:41 PM
SENATOR KIEHL referred to Section 3 of SSSB 12 and the topic of
not allowing credit for time spent under electronic monitoring.
He asked whether the subsection [AS 12.55.027(d)] being repealed
and reenacted was specific to sex offenses or if it was more
broadly applied.
MR. WHITT related his understanding that this would take away
any credits for electronic monitoring during the pretrial phase
regardless of the crime; however, he deferred to Mr. Skidmore to
further address this subsection during his testimony.
CHAIR HUGHES asked Mr. Skidmore to be prepared to address this.
MR. WHITT turned to Section 5 of the sectional analysis for SSSB
12 and asked Ms. Largent to cover any questions related to
Sections 5-8 of the bill.
Section 5: Amends AS 12.55.125(c) to add an enhanced
sentencing structure for assault in the first degree
when a dangerous instrument is used in the assault.
(Page 3, line 8 Page 4, line 4)
1:39:57 PM
REGINA LARGENT, Staff, Senator Shelley Hughes, Alaska State
Legislature, Juneau, on behalf of the sponsor of SSSB 12, said
that Section 5 relates to an existing sentencing enhancement in
AS 12.55.125(c)(1)-(2) for crimes such as sexual assault in the
first degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor, and unclassified
and Class A felonies. Currently, an existing sentence
enhancement exists for a first felony when a dangerous
instrument is used. She referred to AS 12.55.125(c), which is a
subsection of dangerous instruments statutes. She referred to
the definition under [AS 11.81.900](b)(15)(B), which states that
a dangerous instrument means, "hands or other objects when used
to impede normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying
pressure on the throat or neck or obstructing the nose or the
mouth." She returned to Sections 5, 6, and 7, which apply to
assault in the first degree, assault in the second degree, and
assault in the third degree:
Section 5: Amends AS 12.55.125(c) to add an enhanced
sentencing structure for assault in the first degree
when a dangerous instrument is used in the assault.
(Page 3, line 8 Page 4, line 4)
Section 6: Amends AS 12.55.125(d) to add an enhanced
sentencing structure for assault in the second degree
when a dangerous instrument is used in the assault.
(Page 4, line 5 Page 4, line 29)
Section 7: Amends AS 12.55.125(e) to add an enhanced
sentencing structure for assault in the third degree
when a dangerous instrument is used in the assault.
(Page 4, line 30 Page 5, line 23)
MS. LARGENT explained that when an object is used to impede
normal breathing or circulation under these subsections, the
offender would be subject to enhanced sentencing. This would
have a cascading effect in recognition of the seriousness of the
crime. She said that in some jurisdictions this could be
considered attempted murder since death can easily occur or it
places a person in fear of death. She recalled from previous
testimony that most strangulations in Alaska are charged as
assault in the second degree; however, the crime of
strangulation is a more serious and potentially deadly crime
than assault.
1:42:52 PM
MS. LARGENT continued.
Section 8: Amends AS 12.55.125(i) to add increased
presumptive ranges to second- and third-degree sexual
crimes when in the commission of the crime, a
defendant possessed a firearm, used a dangerous
instrument or caused serious physical injury. (Page 5,
line 24 Page 8, line 22)
She explained that this takes the current statute for a first
felony that includes use of a dangerous instrument to enhance
the sentence in a consistent manner creating cascading sentences
down to AS 12.55.125(i(3)&(4). This would apply to sexual
assault in the first degree, unlawful exploitation of a minor,
online enticement of a minor, and attempted and conspiracy or
solicitation of sexual assault in the first degree, or sex
trafficking in the first degree.
She noted that this would not apply to a few crimes, for
example, distribution of pornography, since use of a deadly
instrument would not apply. She said this would apply to the
first felony that includes use of a dangerous instrument to
enhance the presumptive sentencing in [paragraph] (3), which
includes sexual assault in the second degree, sexual abuse of a
minor in the second degree, online enticement and under
[paragraph] (4), attempt, conspiracy, or solicitation of sexual
assault in the second degree, second degree sexual assault of a
minor, or unlawful exploitation of a minor, incest, or indecent
exposure in the first degree.
1:44:58 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked for further clarification on the first three
sections that did not apply to sexual crimes but would be
subject to enhanced sentences. She asked whether Ms. Largent
would give the committee information on the number of years that
would be added under the enhanced sentencing. She stated that
this would give members and the public a better understanding of
how adding the subset of strangulation would impact the sentence
and the amount of time an offender would serve.
MS. LARGENT related her understanding that the Chair was
interested first in enhanced sentencing for assault and then for
sexual assault. She stated that the current sentencing for a
first offense of assault in the first degree [AS 11.41.200], a
class A felony, is three to six years. This provision would
increase the presumptive range to five to seven years for the
first offense.
She stated that the current presumptive sentence range for the
first offense of assault in the second degree [AS 11.41.210],
which is a class B felony, is zero to two years. She pointed out
that Justin Schneider was convicted of assault in the second
degree. This bill would increase the presumptive range to one to
three years.
MS. LARGENT stated the current presumptive sentence range for
assault in the third degree, which is a class C felony, is zero
to two years and this would change that to one to three years.
1:46:48 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked for the penalties for an offender who
committed a second and third felony in each of those categories
since she understood the presumptive sentences would also be
increased.
MS. LARGENT answered yes. The second felony conviction of
assault in the first degree [AS 11.41.200], a class A felony, is
currently eight to 12 years; it would increase to nine to 13
years. A third felony conviction is currently 13-20 years; it
would increase to 14-20 years.
She related that a second felony conviction for assault in the
second degree [AS 11.41.210], a class B felony, is currently two
to five years and that would increase to four to six years under
the bill. The third felony conviction for a class C felony is
currently four to 10 years, and it would increase to seven to 10
years under the bill.
She related that a second felony for assault in the third degree
[AS 11.41.220], which is class C felony, is currently one to
four years and would be increased to two to five years. The
current range for a third felony conviction is two to five years
and would be increased to three to five years.
1:48:34 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked her to review the presumptive sentencing for
sexual assault.
MS. LARGENT referred again to Section 8 and stated that the
current presumptive sentence range under AS 12.55.125(i)(3),
which includes sexual assault in the second degree, sexual
[abuse] of a minor in the second degree, and online enticement
of a minor is five to 15 years. This would increase to 10-25
years under CSSSSB 12, Version O. She clarified that refers to
those sex crimes that included the use of a dangerous instrument
or serious injury. In response to Chair Hughes, she acknowledged
that a dangerous instrument does include strangulation. This
would close a gap by applying this to assault, sexual assault,
and strangulation to the point of unconsciousness.
1:50:17 PM
MS. LARGENT related the presumptive sentencing under [paragraph]
(4), which applies to the crimes of attempt, conspiracy, or a
solicitation to commit sexual assault in the second degree,
sexual abuse of a minor in the second degree, unlawful
exploitation of a minor, incest, indecent exposure in the first
degree, currently is two to 12 years. Under the bill, the
presumptive range would be increased from to seven to 12 years.
1:50:50 PM
MR. WHITT reviewed Section 9 of the sectional analysis.
Section 9: Adds AS 12.61.015(d), a new subsection that
requires the prosecuting attorney to make a reasonable
effort to confer with the victim of a sexual felony
(or their legal guardian) to ascertain if they agree
with the proposed plea agreement. The victim is not
required to respond; however, a record is required of
the consultation. A prosecutor in not bound by the
agreement or disagreement to the proposed plea
agreement (Page 8, lines 23 30)
He said that this change was suggested by the sponsor.
1:51:57 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked how this would change the current practice
of consultation with victims.
CHAIR HUGHES related that Mr. Skidmore, Department of Law would
address this.
1:52:20 PM
MR. WHITT turned to Section 10 of the sectional analysis.
Section 10: Repeals AS 12.55.027(g), which conforms to
section 3 to end sentencing credits for time spent on
electronic monitoring.
He explained that this section is specific to pretrial credit
for time served limited to felony crimes against a person under
AS 11.41, domestic violence crimes, sex offenses, delivery of
controlled substances to a minor, burglary in the first degree,
and arson in the first degree. Current law allows the court to
grant up to 360 days of credit for an offender on electronic
monitoring who has been charged with those crimes. This would
repeal that section and remove all pretrial credit for time
served on electronic monitoring, he said.
1:53:41 PM
MR. WHITT continued.
Section 11: Applicability. (Page 9, line 1 10)
Section [12]: Effective date clause. (Page 9, line 11)
He suggested the bill sponsor may wish to address Section 9.
1:54:14 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE said that current law contains a requirement
for consultation, but a gap currently exists for recording and
documenting the consultation and whether the victim supports the
plea agreement. He suggested that under this language a better
outcome may have occurred [in the Justin Schneider case].
He was under the assumption that it would be difficult for a
victim to agree to a plea bargain. However, in sexual assault
cases, many victims do not want to relive their experiences in
the courtroom and often will support the plea agreement. It is a
much simpler process and would not require their presence in the
courtroom, he said. He offered his belief that his bill may
drive more discussions and consultations, but he was unsure that
it will result in much of a change from the current practice. He
said that sometimes the plea agreement is the best that one can
get, which may be best for the victim. The goal of this
legislation is to do what is best for the victim.
CHAIR HUGHES said some victims do not want to relive the
experience and the victims may not respond or they may decide
not to appear in court. However, if the victims are asked to
review the plea bargain, they may be more apt to review it, and
in doing so, the victims may decide to become more involved. She
thought that aspect was important to bring appropriate justice.
1:56:47 PM
SENATOR KIEHL said he likes the goal but just wanted to
understand how it will work in the district attorney's office
and in the courtroom.
1:57:13 PM
JOHN SKIDMORE, Division Director, Criminal Division, Central
Office, Department of Law, Anchorage, explained how this change
in the law would impact the criminal division's practices.
Currently, the department consults with victims when the
department can contact them. Further, the department's policy is
to record all contacts in the file, but this would require them
to do so. He characterized this provision as the "gold
standard," which is something the department would support, he
said.
1:58:10 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked what the language "shall make a reasonable
effort" means in practice and whether the department would be
concerned about losing cases if a court said it did not make
sufficient effort.
MR. SKIDMORE said he was not concerned about that. He explained
that the courts are adept in interpreting this term. He
interpreted this to mean that the department should contact
victims if contact information is available. The department will
often go beyond those methods and in some instances will use law
enforcement to contact victims. Thus far the department has not
encountered any issues with the term "reasonable."
CHAIR HUGHES asked for further clarification at what point in
the process does the prosecutor reach out to the victim and if
it is initially when the case begins or if it would be during
the plea bargain process.
MR. SKIDMORE answered that the department contacts victims at
various times throughout the process, when a case is initiated,
often prior to arraignment, and during plea changes, depending
on the degree that victims have indicated they want to be
involved. He acknowledged that the department is not perfect,
but its goal is to reach out to victims prior to plea agreements
being reached. The department also has obligations to inform
victims of hearings and to ensure that if they wish to appear in
any sentencing hearing to provide them with an opportunity to
participate.
2:01:07 PM
CHAIR HUGHES recapped that the DOL's current general practice is
that it reaches out to victims on multiple times, including at
the point of a plea bargain agreement being reached, but it may
not be perfect. She asked whether putting this language in
statute will mean it will be done more consistently, even though
it may not always be possible to reach them.
MR. SKIDMORE said that placing the language in statute certainly
provides added incentive since the department will want to
comply with the law.
CHAIR HUGHES said her goal is that it will be done consistently.
2:02:11 PM
SENATOR KIEHL referred to the question of including "semen" in
the definition of sexual contact and leaving it in the crime of
harassment to ensure that the DOL will have the tools to charge
crimes, such as the Justin Schneider case, as a sex crime and
not be bound by the principle of leniency to charge a lesser
crime because it contains the same basic element.
MR. SKIDMORE said the Department of Law (DOL) had those concerns
initially when drafting legislation. However, the DOL believes
that different elements will allow that distinction to be made.
When considering a sexual assault case, the term "without
consent" is a term that many people may use in conversations,
but it is different when used in statute and law. In law, the
concept requires "the use of coercion and force." He related the
distinction, such that an inmate who flings bodily fluid at a
correctional officer does not do so through coercion and force.
However, that situation is very different from the Justin
Schneider case, in which coercion and force was used.
2:04:34 PM
SENATOR KIEHL turned to pretrial credit for time spent on
electronic monitoring. He said he was not generally of the
opinion that sex offenders should be out pretrial. He asked for
further clarification on electronic monitoring. For example, he
acknowledged that the legislature wants offenders with an
addiction problem to be in treatment programs. He asked whether
the incentive structure is being changed to make Alaskan safer.
CHAIR HUGHES asked Mr. Skidmore to also discuss the
administration's reason to put it in [one] of the crime bills.
2:05:55 PM
MR. SKIDMORE answered that electronic monitoring was also
addressed in SB 33. He referred to page 2, Section 3, AS
12.55.127(d), of SSSB12, which relates to electronic monitoring
in a private residence; however, it does not relate to credit
for being in a treatment program. He emphasized that this
provision would not change the ability for someone to obtain
credit while in a treatment program. He said that if this bill
were to pass, a person would still receive credit during a
treatment program. The reason that electronic monitoring is
problematic is two-fold. First, when someone is sentenced for
committing a crime, the person is committed to the Department of
Corrections and the department conducts a risk assessment
analysis to determine how to classify the offender. For example,
the department will assess on a case by case basis, whether the
offender needs to be in minimum or maximum security, and the
person's classification based on any offense the person
committed, among other factors. This is different than the
decision on whether a person should be released pretrial. He
emphasized the difference is that in one case, pretrial, the
person is presumed innocent, but once the person is convicted,
the presumption of innocence no longer applies since the person
has been found guilty. The pretrial assessment only evaluates
whether the person is a flight risk or if the person is a danger
to the community. The classification that the Department of
Corrections (DOC) uses is far more complex when it determines
how to house offenders. He deferred to the DOC to provide more
details. He said the determinations are very different.
2:09:02 PM
MR. SKIDMORE said the pretrial population in prison has
increased significantly over the years. He recalled that when
Senate Bill 91 was passed the figure was about 81 percent over
ten years. The pretrial population is determined by the length
of time a person is in a DOC facility awaiting the determination
of the case, whether it is done by plea or by trial. It seems
that an 81 percent statistical increase must mean that a
significant number of people are being admitted. However, he
cautioned that the 81 percent increase is not just vertical, but
also horizontal, since these figures also include increase in
the timeframe from arraignment until the case is resolved.
Speaking from his 20 years of experience, he said that the
increase in pretrial delay contributes significantly to problems
in managing the prison population.
He offered to connect this to the bill. When offenders in
pretrial status can obtain credit for time on electronic
monitoring, it provides an incentive to delay resolving their
cases. The longer defendants can delay their cases, the less
time they will serve if convicted, he said. This statute removes
the determination by the DOC and puts offenders in jail, based
on their pretrial risk.
MR. SKIDMORE emphasized that these concepts are different ones.
He offered his belief that delays always favor the defendant and
never the victims. Victims who go to court must take time off
from work or school and rearrange their lives to attend court
proceedings, only to see the case has been delayed, which can
happen repeatedly. This provision removes that incentive for
pretrial delays. The same scenario he just described is not
limited to sex offenses, but also applies to property offenses,
including vehicle theft, physical assault, or burglaries.
2:13:01 PM
SENATOR KIEHL asked for clarification that after sentencing the
DOC determines who goes to jail, since he thought judges make
that decision.
MR. SKIDMORE agreed. He clarified that the DOC determines how to
classify someone and where they serve their sentence. He
explained that the legislature passed a statute that allows
certain people to be released on electronic monitoring to serve
their sentences. He said a series of factors exist, which is
different than pretrial. He asked whether it is it possible to
serve a sentence on electronic monitoring and said the answer is
yes, but the judge determines the length of time. The DOC
ultimately decides if the person is a good candidate for
electronic monitoring.
2:14:11 PM
SENATOR SHOWER asked if pretrial delays should be considered in
SB 33.
MR. SKIDMORE responded that the concept in SB 12 is the same one
that is found in SB 33. He was unsure which bill will pass but
having the provision in both bills would be helpful.
2:15:25 PM
SENATOR MICCICHE said that Senator Kiehl framed his question on
substance abuse. He said that this bill would return first time
drug possession to a felony. He asked for further clarification
on the benefits of suspended imposition of sentence (SIS) to
complete their treatment outside the facility. He suggested it
would tend to serve the same purpose in a treatment plan to
provide credit for time served on electronic monitoring.
MR. SKIDMORE said those are two different concepts, but he
agreed both achieve the same goal. He said a provision in
statute, in AS 12.55.127, authorizes credit against an ultimate
sentence that is imposed for time spent in a residential
treatment program. In addition, one of the tools Senator
Micciche just mentioned is an SEJ, suspended entry of judgment.
He explained that an SEJ allows the prosecution and the defense
to agree that a defendant should complete a set of conditions,
similar to probation. The defendant who completes the conditions
can avoid a conviction on the person's record. For example, a
person who has an addiction and is charged with possession of
drugs would be charged. However, the case could be resolved if
the person agreed to treatment for six months or more than a
year. The statute does not limit the prosecution or the
defense's ability to decide on the length of treatment. The one
in statute would be court ordered. Ultimately, if the client is
convicted, the time spent in a residential treatment program can
be credited towards the person's sentence. This is different
than a SEJ since it lacks a conviction since a sentence is not
imposed. The third concept is a suspended imposition of sentence
or an SIS, which would apply to someone who is convicted, but
the sentence is suspended while the person is on probation. If
the person meets the conditions, the sentence would be set
aside, and the person would not serve jail time. He recapped
that under an SIS a person who is convicted must meet certain
conditions, and if so, would not go to jail. Under an SEJ the
conviction is never entered. The third way to reduce a sentence
is to go to a residential treatment program pretrial.
2:19:28 PM
CHAIR HUGHES declared a conflict of interest because a family
member has a relationship to the therapeutic court in
prescribing certain medication.
MR. SKIDMORE agreed a fourth option exists for someone
struggling with addiction. Several therapeutic court programs
exist in Alaska. The idea is to find individuals who enter the
criminal justice system because of substance abuse problems. The
court monitors them, instead of a probation officer. The
offender would sign agreements and if the person successfully
completes the requirements, it results in a reduced sentence or
avoiding conviction. He said the difference between the
therapeutic court and the SEJ is that the therapeutic court is
monitored and managed by a judge and an SEJ is an agreement
between two parties. These are all options within the criminal
justice system that work towards the same goal.
2:21:10 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked whether a person can be ordered to treatment
and be on electronic monitoring.
MR. SKIDMORE said he has not encountered it, but he was unsure.
He said one statute says an offender cannot get credit for being
on electronic monitoring, but another one states that the person
is entitled to credit for attending a treatment program. He said
that a court may not grant credit against a sentence of
imprisonment for time spent in a private residence or on
electronic monitoring. The person would not get credit for time
spent on electronic monitoring but would be eligible for credit
for time spent in a treatment program. He offered his belief
that this statute would not interfere in that circumstance and
should not have an impact.
CHAIR HUGHES said that if necessary, it could be addressed in SB
33.
2:22:40 PM
SENATOR KIEHL wanted to think about how it would affect those
with mental health problems. He acknowledged the role of
providing incentives. He expressed concern about the risk of re-
offense. He related a scenario in which someone is on electronic
monitoring on medication. He asked for further clarification on
the public safety benefit to imprison someone who goes off
medication and commits a crime of threatening someone with a
pool cue, since it removes them from all the predictors of
success.
MR. SKIDMORE said the mistake is the presumption that someone
goes to prison. He said that in the circumstance described, the
judges would have discretion. He said that it is important that
law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, and probation and parole
officers all have discretion. He said a wide range of offenses
exists, and within that range, a wide range of individuals
commit the offenses. He agreed that Senator Kiehl laid out a
circumstance in which the person should not go to prison or if
so, just for a short period of time. The DOC still has the
ability to conduct classifications to determine if the person
really needs to be in a "hard bed" or should serve the remaining
sentence on electronic monitoring. He personally has seen lots
of cases with people being placed on probation or having
suspended sentences. He acknowledged some people would go to
prison.
2:26:03 PM
SENATOR KIEHL pointed out that Section 7 would make it a
presumptive sentence of one to three years under assault in the
third degree with a dangerous instrument.
MR. SKIDMORE said that in his hypothetical he mentions a pool
cue. He referred to page 5 to Section 7, which defines a
dangerous instrument in 11.81.900(b)(15)(B), which relates to
strangulation using hands or other objects. He said the one to
three years would not apply in that circumstance. However, if
the pool cue was used to strangle someone, the one to three
years is a presumptive term, which does not mean the court would
need to impose one to three years. He said there are statutory
mitigators that could be applied that would allow a court to go
below the one year. The person has options that could keep them
out of jail, he said.
2:27:35 PM
CHAIR HUGHES asked for further clarification on whether someone
in prison could be on medication.
JENNFER WINKELMAN, Director, Division of Probation and Parole,
Department of Corrections, Juneau, answered that is correct.
CHAIR HUGHES recalled that the Department of Corrections
commissioner related that in the goal to reduce recidivism. For
those not on an ankle monitor but in the prison system that it
might deter the things that would help that person. The person
might be more apt to become a habitual offender and repeat
crimes upon exiting prison. She asked whether she would briefly
discuss ways the DOC will change things to help ensure
recidivism goals are met, and the person can become a productive
citizen.
MS. WINKELMAN said that within the institution, the DOC will
place the offender in the least restrictive housing that is
necessary. She said the risk assessment will determine where the
person will be placed. Once the person is out on probation or
parole the DOC's mission, by statute, is to do everything to
work towards rehabilitation. She said that this can be
accomplished by giving the department the discretion to assess
each person's needs for placement in the facility and how to
work with them when they are out on the street.
CHAIR HUGHES said SB 34 will be before the committee next week.
She expressed an interest in having the department inform the
Senate Judiciary Standing Committee on how it will be different.
She agreed that Senator Kiehl is correct that those in jail were
more apt to recommit crimes and how these bills will change that
paradigm. She wanted the record to reflect that the goal is to
have people exiting the criminal justice system in better shape
to help ensure safety in our communities.
2:31:27 PM
CHAIR HUGHES turned to Section 9. She said over 7,000 sexual
offenses happen each year. She asked whether victims who felt
uncomfortable attending sentencing would be able to provide the
feedback without appearing at the proceeding.
MR. SKIDMORE answered yes. He said that multiple ways exist for
a victim to provide information. First, victims can avail
themselves to the Office of Victim's Rights, which is a group of
attorneys who help victims understand the system and their
rights. He said that the organization can appear and speak on
behalf of the victim. Secondly, any victim can write a letter to
the judge. A third option is that the victim can talk to the
Department of Law, who can speak on behalf of the victim at the
sentencing. He said that the DOL is clear to identify when they
are speaking on behalf of a victim rather than as a prosecutor.
Finally, the victim could participate in the proceeding
telephonically, he said.
2:34:03 PM
SENATOR KIEHL referred to Section 1, adding dangerous instrument
to the definition of strangulation. He asked whether forearms,
knees, or other parts of body are covered in the definition.
MR. SKIDMORE agreed that those are covered.
2:35:05 PM
CHAIR HUGHES removed her objection. She said that the committee
substitute, work order 31-LS0263\O, Version O, has been adopted
as the working document.
[SB 12 was held in committee.]
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| SJUD Agenda 3.1.19.pdf |
SJUD 3/1/2019 1:30:00 PM |
|
| CSSSSB12 Version O.pdf |
SJUD 3/1/2019 1:30:00 PM |
SB 12 |
| CSSSSB12 Explanation of Changes from Version U to O.pdf |
SJUD 3/1/2019 1:30:00 PM |
SB 12 |
| CSSSSB 12 Sectional Summary Version O.pdf |
SJUD 3/1/2019 1:30:00 PM |
SB 12 |